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"COST OF MONEY' AS THE DETERMINAN T OF
PUBLIC-UT iTY RATES
Harold .Ml. Soiners*
The traditional method of setting public utility rates is to
arrive at a rate base and a rate of return on that base, determine
what earnings result from applying the rate of return to the rate
base, and then set utility rates that will result in those earnings.
There has been much controversy over the proper rate base and
relatively little over the "going" rate of return. In recent years,
however, the determination of the rate of return has been opened
up to a fuller consideration of the "cost of money": what the
company must pay to obtain the money to finance its investments.
This emphasis on "cost of money" is traceable in part to the
attempt by regulatory bodies in some states to keep the rate base
inviolate and allow disturbing elements like inflation to express
themselves-if they can-in the rate of the return via the "cost
of money". There have been some startling consequences of this
development, consequences which may lead to a complete revision
of the technique of administrative agencies in setting utility rates.
In New York, the Public Service Commission has retreated to
a strict cost basis thus virtually eliminating the problem of valua-
tion. Since the resulting revenue may be inadequate under present
conditions if the rate of return is limited to, say, 5%, the expe-
dient of modifying the rate of return rather than the valuation of
property has ostensibly been employed. One of the tasks of the
agency is now supposed to be that of ensuring sufficient revenue
to prevent a flight of capital from the public utilities and to attract
sufficient capital for necessary improvement and expansion. Thus
the prospective investor becomes the key figure and the "cost of
money", broadly interpreted, is the crucial item of evidence. The
emphasis throughout is on future prospects and how they influence
a potential investor. Although "cost" is used as the rate base
there is actually a concession made to replacement value in the
broadest sense-the value of replacement of the capital funds
necessary to the business.
The most recent example in New York is the decision of the
Public Service Commission on the motion of the New York Tele-
phone Company for approval of increases in rates and charges.
The decision, adopted August 5, 1954 denied the company's mo-
tion.1 Material increases had been approved in 1930,2 reductions
* Professor of Economics and Dean, School of Business Administration, University
of Buffalo.
1. Case 16548. Re: New York Telephone Company, 5 PUR 3d 33 (August 5,
1954). State of New York Public Service Commission. Page references herein are
to the separate print issued by the Commission.
2. Case 6177. Re: New York Telephone Company, Ann. Rep. Pub. Serv. Comm.
213, PUR 1930 C, 325.
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ordered in 1936,3 moderate increases approved in 1950,4 and further
increases denied in 1951,, with some increases allowed subsequent-
ly to take account of specified increases in taxes and wages. The
Commission's current decision is now up for review before the
Appellate Division, Third Department, a rehearing having been
denied by the Commission.6
The methods of rate-making that are employed and some of
the resulting problems will be reviewed in the next five sections
of this paper. The potential significance of the "cost of money"
approach for future rate regulation will then be indicated.
1. OIGINAL COST v. RiPRODUCTION COST
The first task is to find a rate base against which to apply an
appropriate rate of return. In its sharpest form, the conflict is
between "original cost" and "reproduction cost." Must the
utility commission take account of reproduction cost and other
reflections of price changes? May it ignore reproduction cost in
determining the rate base if the governing statute requires the
commission to take account of "value" of property in setting
rates? Where the term "value" appears in this way the com-
panies have argued that current market value or reproduction
cost must be considered by the commission. A particularly strong
case is made for this interpretation in New York where the statute
uses "value" for telephone companies but not for electric and
gas utilities. Section 97 of the Public Service Law, covering tele-
phone and telegraph companies, states in part:
. the commission shall, with due regard, among other
things, to a reasonable average return upon the value of the
property actually used in the public service and to the necessity
of making reservation out of income for surplus and contingen-
cies, determine the just and reasonable rates . . .7
3. Case 8230. Re: New York Telephone Company, Ann. Rep. Pub. Serv. Comm.
529, 14 PUR (NS) 443 (1936).
4. Case 14131. Re: New York Telephone Company, Ann. Rep. Pub. Serv. Comm.
373, 84 PUR (NS) 267 (1950).
5. Case 15235. Re: New York Telephone Company, Ann. Rep. Pub. Scrv. Comm.
399, 91 PUR (NS) 231 (1951).
6. The company's petition contended that the Commission should have taken into
account the current value of property owned by the utility; and that the Commission
violated the Public Service Law by using a base consisting of original cost less de-
preciation and refusing to recognize "replacement cost" figures. 54 Pun. UTIL. FoRT.
843-844 (1954).
For a discussion of telephone cases prior to 1951 see Rose, The Bell Telephone
System Rate Cases, 37 VA. L. Rxv. 699 (1951). For more recent reviews, see Rose,
The Hope Case and Public Utility Valuation in the States, 54 CoLUSX. L. Ray. 188 (1954)
and Bates, Telephone Rate Case Developments, 54 PuB. Urn,. FoRT. 412 (1954).
7. A similar provision is contained in Section 49 covering railroads. Section 72
covering electric and gas utilities refers to "capital actually expended."
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Applying one of the standard rules of statutory construction,
the apparently deliberate distinction in terminology between the
telephone and other statutes is argued as indicating an intention
to give telephone companies a special standard of valuation. The
Commission, however, applies a standard of reasonableness to the
intent of the Legislature:
It is inconceivable, at least to this Commission, that the Legis-
lature of this State intended that telephone rates should be fixed
at any different standard than those of electric, gas or water
utilities.8
We are unable to decipher any occult or hidden intention of the
Legislature to set up any different standards of regulation for
telephone companies than for other utilities. What the Legisla-
ture was clearly intending to do was to provide a test which, on
its face, met all constitutional requirements.
The arguments advanced show no basic reason why the tele-
phone industry should receive more favorable treatment in
times of expanded prices and less favorable treatnent in times
of decline of prices than other utilities. In fact, because of the
volatility of the business (the company urges on us strongly
that it possesses this characteristic to a far greater extent than
the electric companies), the reasons for a fixed rather than a
varying rate base are even stronger.9
The term "value" suffered a-similar fate in an earlier case.
In a brief fied with the New York Public Service Commission in
1951, the New York Telephone Company argued very forcefully
that the Commission should consider reproduction cost in setting
rates.10 The U. S. Supreme Court in the Hope Natural Gas Case
in 194411 had virtually overruled its 1898 decision in Smyth v.
Ames,' which had required the consideration of "fair value" in
setting the base in order to meet the constitutional standard of
due process. The Company nevertheless argued that since the
New York statute requires consideration of "value" the Commis-
sion must still accept evidence pertaining to value, including repro-
duction cost. In other words, the company argued, the Supreme
Court did not preclude consideration of "value" where the statute
required it but merely established that the end result had to be
8. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 13.
9. Id. at 17.
10. "Memorandum in Support of Offer of Proof." Case No. 15235 Re: New
York Telephone Company. New York Public Service Commission (Typescript April
26, 1951).
Another approach is to use trended original cost, which has been held pertinent
to a determination of reproduction cost in Illinois. Re: Central Illinois Electric &
Gas Company, 6 PUR 3d 108, 114 (1954).
11. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591 (1944).
12. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466 (1898).
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just and reasonable regardless of the method used to achieve it.
The Commission rejected the telephone company's offer of evi-
dence of reproduction cost but indicated that evidence on inflation
was acceptable on the question of rate of return.'3
The Commission has remained adamant oh the question of
original cost. It has said:
The Commission refuses to depart from its now well established
practice of fixing rates on the basis of the original cost of the
Company's property dedicated to the public use. It rejects the
claim of the Company that rates should be fixed upon estimates
of the present cost to reproduce the Company's plant, or esti-
mates of its "fair value. ' 14
Just how strict this policy is may be indicated from a case
involving a gas company. In a memorandum in support of offer
of proof before the New York Commission in 1953, the Pennsyl-
vania Gas Company argued, not for the use of detailed evidence
of reproduction cost as the rate base, but merely for the submis-
sion of evidence indicating the original cost adjusted for certain
overall price trends. 5 Such information, it felt, would be helpful
in the Commission's consideration of proper rate of return, if
for no other purpose. This evidence was rejected by the Com-
mission.' 6
The Public Service Commission does not deny that it must
take account of changing economic forces but it insists that it
must do so only to the extent of ensuring a certain degree of
stability in the dollar return, not in the real return (i. e. a dollar
return that is high enough to allow for inflation). The Commis-
sion insists that the investor in public utility shares anticipated
the former rather than the latter when he made his investment.
13. Case No. 15235. Re: New York Telephone Company, New York Public
Service Commission, October 3, separate print p. 29 (1951). The District of Columbia
commission has treated the factor of inflation as "one of the many intangibles affecting
the choice of rates within the reasonable range set by the factors more relevant to the
determination." Re: Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Company, PUC No. 1812/56,
Formal Case No. 430, Order No. 4096 (July 29, 1954), 54 Pun. UTIL. FORT. 610 (1954).
14. Case No. 15235. Re: New York Telephone Company, New York Public
Service Commission, separate print p. 48, 49 (1951). The Delaware Supreme Court has
recently indicated that reproduction cost might be given "substantial" weight in setting
the rate base. Re: Diamond State Telephone Co., 54 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 392, 393 (1954).
For some indications of a trend in the direction of replacement cost see 54 Pun. UTIL.
FORT. 104-105 (1954).
15. "Memorandum in Support of Offer of Proof." Case No. 16108. Re: Penn-
sylvania Gas Company, New York Public Service Commission, (Typescript March 23,
1953).
16. "Brief for Pennsylvania Gas Company." Case No. 16108. Re: Pennsylvania
Gas Company. New York Public Service Commission. (Typescript November 9, 1953).
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The Commission says:
Lest we be deliberately misunderstood, it should be made abun-
dantly clear that just as we cannot disregard the economic reali-
ties of our daily business life, so also in a rate case, we must in
like manner consider the cumulative effect of current economic
forces upon the company whose rates we are fixing. Certainly
the investor considers these before committing his money to the
enterprise..
In the case of the American Telephone & Telegraph Company
many of its million and a quarter stockholders have undoubtedly
been attracted to it by reason of the past and expectation of the
future continuance of the $9 dividend. This fact has been very
effective in aiding the company in its tremendous job of financ-
ing since the last World War.
. . [W]ell informed [these investors] are on the matter
most vital to them, namely that the past record of the company
offers the prospect of a continued annual payment in the same
number of dollars. There appears no basis for the argument
that they anticipated double that number of dollars because of
the diminution in purchasing power. 17
In determining the value of a telephone company's plant, we
cannot use the standards of competition in the industry because
these do not exist. There is, however, another standard of com-
petition and that is competition in the money market for capi-
tal. If the rates fixed are too low and the income is insufficient,
there will be a flight of capital from the telephone industry to
other types of investment. The converse is equally true. "Value"
as used by the Legislature is the end result and does not, as
contended by the company, constitute the point of departure.18
No regulation can be sound or effective nor can it be fair to the
utility or to its customers if made in a vacuum. Nor can it
ignore the economic facts of life such as the trends of business,
17. See Case 16548, spra, pp. 21-22. The California commission has voiced
similar sentiments. See 54 PuB. UTm. FORT. 544 (October 14, 1954).
18. Case 16548, spra, note 1 at 18.
Cf: "In order to keep utilities healthy and enable them to provide the service
demanded by the public, they should be entitled to such a return as to enable them to
attract capital for the natural growth that utilities must have." Re: Southwestern Bell
Telephone Company, (Illinois Commerce Commission) 6 PUR 3d 41, 44 (October
20, 1954).
Arkansas has stated that "the basic test of an adequate return for a public utility
is the cost of servicing and attracting capital to the industry." Re: Southwestern Bell
Teleph. Co., (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm.) 2 PUR 3d 1, 9 (1953).
North Carolina allowed an increase in rate of return of a small telephone com-
pany from 3.02 to 6Y2 per cent where the company was "badly in need of additional
capital in order to improve and expand its telephone plant" and there was evidence
that the increased rate of return was necessary in order to attract capital. Re: Albe-
marle Teleph. Co., (N. C. Pub. Ut. Comm.) 2 PUR 3d 30, 32 (1953).
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of prices, or of the national tax structure. It seems, however,
that the company asks this Commission to go one step further
and to make a determination not alone in the light of the factors
which affect the business world but to adopt a regulatory process
which insures it and its equity investors (not those from which
it borrows money) a complete protection against any loss which
economic conditions may threaten. To put it another way, the
company's position goes to the extent of asking a regulatory
body to insure that equity capital devoted to a utility enterprise
shall be forever preserved in its original integrity, irrespective
of the tax policies of government or fluctuations in economic
conditions. It asks for its stockholders not only what is vir-
tually a bondholder's assurance of steady income, with more
than twice the bondholder's annual percentage, but also a hedge
against inflation which is beyond the bondholder's dreams.
This is not our conception of the purpose of regulation nor, ad-
mitting for the sake of the argument that such contemplated
legal power exists, do we believe such a result possible. No-
where in modern economics do we find a case where such an ob-
jective has been permanently maintained. We realize that
styles change in investments as well as human attire. We ap-
preciate that a utility must earn an adequate amount to make
its securities attractive in the current money market. When that
test has been met our obligation in that respect has been dis-
charged. It is true that if inflation became completely uncon-
trolled all the standards of the past would become outmoded and
some new standards would be required if the extinguishment of
capital savings is to be prevented. That point, however, has not
been reached in this country.1 9
In the above statement, the Commission rejects most em-
phatically the contention that the investor in utility equities is
entitled to protection against inflation. It also says:
The company . . . contends . . . that the investor in util-
ity securities is entitled to some special protection against the
loss in the purchasing power of his dollars committed to the
enterprise. This contention, of course is made only as to the
equity investor.
. . . this contention is completely rejected. The causes of
inflation with the resultant decline in the purchasing power of
the dollar are not the result of the processes of regulation but
of national if not world-wide, economic conditions . 20
We find nothing in our statutes, or the reported decisions,
which guarantees to the investor in utility equities insurance
against the results of economic forces or even the political poli-
cies of any national administration.2 1
19. Case 16548, mspra, note 1 at 22-23.
20. Case 16548, Id. at 20.
21. Case 16548, Id. at 21.
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The crucial question to be decided, however, is whether current
prices must nevertheless be considered where the governing stat-
ute requires consideration of "value".
The logical problems involved in setting a "fair value" rate
base are apparent. The Supreme Court has said that "rates
cannot be made to depend upon 'fair value' when the value of
the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates
may be anticipated."122 In the ordinary sense, "fair value" must
depend on future earnings. Yet future earnings are to be deter-
mined on the rate base. Thus it becomes impossible to set a "fair
value" without knowing the rates, and yet the rates are to be
determined by taking account of the "fair value" base. The same
logical problems do not arise where "fair value" is narrowly con-
strued to mean reproduction cost or original cost adjusted for gen-
eral price changes. Prevailing prices, specific or general, can then
be used.
The Tenth Circuit has concluded that "fair value" cannot be
used as a rate base: "In other words, fair value is the end prod-
uct and not the means of the rate-making process. ' ' 2" This conclu-
sion is fully consistent with the "flight of capital" doctrine under
which the emphasis is on setting earnings at an appropriate level
rather than on setting an appropriate base. The earnings that
prevent a flight of capital will yield a certain value for the prop-
erty but that value may not be a "fair" one from the point of
view of existing stockholders. As far as the constitutional stand-
ard is concerned, "Fair value is no longer deemed an essential
ingredient of an economic rate base for rate-making purposes. 2
24
Where the governing statute requires consideration of "value",
however, the problem cannot be disposed of so easily.
In setting its rates the commission is limited by substantive
as well as procedural due process. In the exercise of the state's
police power it is bound to determine rates that are "just and
reasonable." Does a "just and reasonable" rate necessarily have
to be based on investment cost, fair value or other specific base?
The Supreme Court of Utah has answered this question in the
negative. The court has said:
The statute cannot be construed as requiring the Commission
to fix utility rates on a value rate base. The Legislature gave
full rate-making power to the Commission subject only to the
22. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591,601 (1944).
23. Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Co,nmission, 155 F. 2d 694, 701 (10th
Cir. 1946). cert. denied, 329 U. S. 773 (1946).
24. "Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., supra; Hope Natural
Gas Co., supra; Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 324 U. S.
581 (1945)"; Cities Service Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, spra, note 23 at 701.
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limitations of procedural due process and the requirement that
the rate established be just and reasonable. This standard 'just
and reasonable' has been held to be the same as the constitu-
tional standard. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas
Pipeline Co. (1942) 315 U. S. 575, 86 L. ed. 1037, 42 PU-R
(N. S.) 129, 62 S. Ct. 736. At the time of Smyth v. Ames a rate
could not be just and reasonable in the constitutional sense un-
less it permitted a fair return on fair value. This concept has,
as pointed out above, been overruled. It would be contrary to
common sense to hold that the legislature meant 'just and rea-
sonable' only as defined by the courts at the time of Smyth v.
Ames and to hold that the legislature would, in order to au-
thorize the Commission to use prudent investment, be required
to reenact the statute saying that it meant 'just and reasonable'
as that term is construed today. To the contrary, it must be as-
sumed that the legislature contemplated that the concept of
that which is 'just and reasonable' might change with social
trends.25
Does this emphasis on "just and reasonable" rates open the
field wide to an almost unlimited use of discretion by the commis-
sion? Is there no need for the commission to bother with a rate
base and rate of return; can it go directly to a "just and reason-
able" utility rate structure? It will be indicated in the concluding
section of this paper that considerable authority can be garnered
for an affirmative answer to these questions.
It may be that the entire issue of reproduction and original
cost is of dwindling significance until the next major inflationary
spurt. The difference between original cost and reproduction
cost decreases as more and more plant and equipment is replaced
at inflated prices. The New York Public Service Commission
points out in the current New York Telephone case:
The company's own evidence established that the ratio of re-
production cost new to actual cost was declining. This, of
course, would be true for many reasons: the flattening out of
the price curve, the continuing retirement of old property built
at low cost and large additions at current prices.26
This is a general situation, as may be illustrated further in
the case of Florida:
Practically all of our public utilities have expanded their facili-
ties to such an extent during the past five or six years that the
25. Utah Power and Light Co. v. P. S. C., 107 Utah 155, 152 P (2d) 542 (1944).
By way of contrast it may be noted that the Indiana Commission recently valued all
property actually used and useful for the public convenience at its current fair cash value.
Re: New Lisbon Telephone Co., No. 25201, July 8, 1954. 54 PuB. UTn. FoT. 614(1954).
26. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 14.
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vast majority of the utility plant now in service has been in-
stalled at more or ]ess inflated prices. Consideration of repro-
duction cost new under such circumstances would be of little
benefit to the utilities at the present time. On the other hand,
if we should enter upon a prolonged period of depression with
resulting deflated costs, a rate base predicated upon reproduction
cost new then would place most Florida public utilities in seri-
ous jeopardy.27
The trend away from valuation of property to concentration
on the setting of a just and reasonable return carries with it many
important legal implications. The older constitutional emphasis
was on the narrow question of confiscation of property; the newer
emphasis is on the broader question of the use of the police
27. Utility Regulatory Climate in Florida, 54 PUB. UTm. FoRT. 567, 568-9 (1954).
Expansion at current costs presents new problems. The constantly rising rate base
makes the regulatory lag of serious importance. In Massachusetts, the court recently
recommitted a case to the regulatory body where the rate of return when set was 6.313%
but was tending toward the 5% level as the expansion program progressed, the court
having previously set 6.23% as the "line where confiscation begins" [see note 23, infra].
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, - Mass.
- 121 N.E. 2d 896, 906-907 (1954). The Maryland Public Service Commission has
similarly tried to overcome the effects of the regulatory lag by calculating the permissible
net income on the basis of a 6 per cent return where it found a return of 5.75 per cent
to 6 per cent to be reasonable for a telephone company. Re: Chesapeake & Potomac
Telephone Company of Baltimore City, 5 PUR 3d 161, 170 (1954). Kentucky has acted
similarly. Re: Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., (Kentucky Public Service Commission)
6 PUR 3d 18, 24 (Sept. 1, 1954) ; as has Utah. Re:Mountait States Teleph. & Teleg.
Co., (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm.) 2 PUR 3d 75, 90 (1953).
Arkansas permits the latest substantiated expenditures for property, including plant
under construction and investment in materials and supplies, particularly in a period of
inflation when the company has experienced an attrition of earnings. It does not, however,
permit a projection into the future: "The inevitable delay required to process an applica-
tion for a revision in rates may cause some inequities resulting from operating changes
occurring in the interim . . .. We do not believe that we can eliminate these inequities
by guessing about future earnings which may affect Southwestern's operations. The
errors inherent in speculative estimates are likely to far outweigh the equities which
may be accomplished." Re: Southwestern Bell Teleph. Co., (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm.)
2 PUR 3d 1. 8-9 (1953).
Colorado likewise rejects projection: "... the setting of a rate base on a specula-
tive figure for plant valuation when such improvement would be made in the future, with
a compensatory rate of return predicted [possibly "predicated"] thereon, is rate making
in reverse." Re: Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co., (Colo. Pub. Ut. Comm.) 1 PUR
3d 129, 144 (1953). Nevertheless, the commission tries to take cognizance of the
problem of attrition by setting a valuation which "will provide some compensation for
the attrition in the company's earnings" and it says that "in arriving at a rate of return
of 6.69 per cent . . . the commission has bad in mind this question of attrition." Id.
at 146.
The Federal Power Commission has used a test period but has refused to use
forecasts: "Our settled policy and practice, and we believe the only proper policy and
practice, is to test rates for the future on the basis of actual operating experience of a
representative period of time and to adjust that experience for known changes which have
occurred or will occur. We have consistently refused to adjust rates on the basis of
forecasts which are inherently uncertain and speculative." Re: Northern Natural Gas
Company, (Federal Power Commission) 95 PUR (NS) 289, 298 (1952).
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power.28 The burden of proof on the utility is very different in the
two cases, as the telephone company and many other utilities have
discovered. Can the entire problem be avoided by emphasis on
"flight of capital" rather than rate base?
2. THE FLIGHT OF CAPITAL
The next step after establishing a rate base is to determine
the rate of return on that base. The resulting computation (rate
of return x rate base) yields a sum available for the suppliers of
capital, both equity and debt capital. Existing debt capital has a
known fixed return. How much money should the suppliers of
equity capital receive? The Hope case said:
the return to the equity owner should be commensurate with
returns on investments in other enterprises having correspond-
ing risks. That return, moreover, should be sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, as to
maintain its credit and to attract capital. 29
This is the "flight of capital" or the "cost of money" approach
to the determination of a rate of return.
A recent New Mexico case which follows the New York com-
mission very closely indicates the limit that must be adhered to in
giving weight to the flight of capital:
28. See the article on Public Utilities by Hon. Philip Halpern in NEW YoRK STATE
LEGISLATIVE ANNUAL 1947, 223, 224. Massachusetts uses the confiscation doctrine as a
limiting principle in setting the rate of return. It has labelled an overall rate of 4.887%
as "confiscatory and unlawful" and has set 6.23% as "the line where confiscation begins."
New England Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Department of Public Utilities,
327 Mass. 81, 97 N. E. 2d 509, 517 (1951). Similarly, it has said that the adoption of a
debt ratio of 45% was not "unlawful or confiscatory," the actual ratio being 62.1%
and the company requesting 35%, id., at 515. See Rose, The Bell Telephone System
Rate Cases, supra, note 6 at 718 n. 68, for earlier cases.
In a more recent case, the Massachusetts court affirmed its refusal to prescribe any
theory or method for determining the rate base in absence of proof of confiscation.
New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, - Mass.
__ 121 N. E. 2d 896, 904 (1954). North Dakota has considered a return of less than
42% on money prudently invested inadequate. Re: Northwestern Bell Teleph. Co.
(N. D. Pub. Serv. Comm.), 2 PUR 3d 93, 95-6 (1953).
The emphasis on "police power" aspects is illustrated in a recent case in Ohio
where the commission said:
It is the opinion of this commission that it is not so much what a utility company
is legally entitled to earn that is involved in the determination of reasonable return,
but rather what the said company must earn if it is to be able to continue that
adequate utility service which its customers have every right to enjoy and which
the law of Ohio assumes said utility company will render. Re: Mt. Vernon Teleph.
Corp. No. 24, 242, October 22, 1954. 54 PuB. UTm. FoRT. 847 (1954).
29. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 603 (1944).
"COST OF MONEY" AS THE DETERMINANT
S..while the return for the utility should be sufficient to
enable it to obtain funds in the capital markets in competition
with other businesses of like risk, that return should be no
greater than necessary for that purpose.30
The California commission is even more conservative:
. . . [E]arnings-price ratios merely reflect the prospective
investors' appraisal of the market value of stock and, as such,
are influenced by prevailing market and economic conditions
and the individual requirements of the purchasers. While it is
true that such ratios may indicate the terms under which a new
investor might devote his money to the business, it does not
mean that they should measure the return the applicant is en-
titled to receive on its investment in its properties. Certainly,
the dividend rate the management has elected to establish for
its common shares should not be used in arriving at the return
the consumer should pay on the rate base.3 1
It should be pointed out that a fair return to investors is not
necessarily fair to consumers. Utility rates set by the "cost of
money" approach may well be unfair to consumers, hence the
"cost of money" does not provide a conclusive method of deter-
mining such rates. The same can be said of the rate base method.
Neither method gives assurance of fairness to consumers.
There is also a question whether the rate structure that would
prevent a "flight of capital" is the same as that which would
30. New Mexico State Corporation Co,nmission v. Mountain States Telephone &
Telegraph Company, 58 N.M. 260, 270 P. 2d 685 (1954).
In California, an electric company was recently authorized to increase rates to
produce a return of 6.9 per cent where increased operating cost and the loss of its largest
customer had resulted in a substantial reduction in revenues. Re: Bay Point Light &
Power Company, 6 PUR 3d 125 (1954). In Missouri a return of 6.09 was recently
deemed adequate for a natural gas company. Re: Missouri Public Service Company,
6 PUR 3d 88, 90 (1954). The Illinois commission has recently considered a return of
5.5 per cent on the fair value of a telephone company's property for intrastate operations
just and reasonable. Re: Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, (Illinois Commerce
Commission) 6 PUR 3d 41, 44 (Oct. 20, 1954). Maryland has determined that a fair
and reasonable return for a natural gas company was at a minimum of 5.75 per cent
and a maximum of 6 per cent. Re: Cucmberland & Allegheny Gas Company, (Maryland
Pub. Serv. Comm.) 6 PUR 3d 25, 29 (Sept. 22, 1954).
The Vermont commission recently authorized a telephone rate increase calculated
to yield a 6 per cent return. It said that this return was not excessive but was sufficient
to enable the company to attract capital. Re: Springfield Local Teleph. Co. No. 2672,
November 22, 1954. 55 Ptr. UTn.. FORT. 231 (1955). Rate increases designed to pro-
duce returns of 5.8 per cent for the electric department and 5.95 per cent for the
gas department of a gas and electric company have been considered reasonable in Illinois.
Re: Central Illinois Electric & Gas Company, 6 PUR 3d 108, 114 (1954).
North Carolina has approved a 6.5 per cent return on net investment for a tele-
phone company as fair and reasonable. Re: Albemarle Teleph. Co., (N. C. Lt. Comm.)
2 PUR 3d 30, 32 (1953).
31. Re: Southern California Edison Co., Application No. 33952, No. 50449, August
17, 1954. 54 PuB. UTm. FoRT. 544 (1954).
32. Federal Power Comm. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575 (1942).
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achieve what may be called an "inflow of capital." '3 8 It is the
latter that is important in a dynamic economy. The commission
presumably wishes the utilities to expand as the needs arise and
as innovations become available. To prevent a flight of capital
is merely to insure stagnation. Because of the factor of inertia
it is reasonable to assume that a higher return is necessary to
attract capital than to prevent its flight. Thus the test should not
be "flight of capital" but the higher return of "inflow of capital."
There is some difficulty in meeting the Public Service Com-
mission's requirements on evidence as to flight of capital and the
cost of money for purposes of determining the rate of return. In
a brief filed in November 1953 by the Niagara Frontier Transit
System the cost of equity capital was computed on the market
price of common stock.34 Vhat was essentially involved was a
price-earnings ratio. In its decision (favorable to the Company),
the Commission adopted its examiner's report objecting to the
computation on two grounds, but conceding that the data had
relevance. The examiner said:
Apart from other considerations, it is questionable if such com-
putations for a company so recently reorganized and which has
never paid a dividend on its outstanding stock since reorganiza-
tion, serve to give a proper indication of the return which might
be proper upon a stable rate base. Certainly such computations
cannot be taken as valid criteria of the percentage relationship
which net operating income after taxes should bear to the book
value of operating omnibus property. It does perhaps serve to
point up the fact that even a reorganized company cannot hope
to continue operations indefinitely without return to its equity
security holders and that continuation of the spiral of increas-
ing wages and declining traffic must result in higher fares or
curtailment of service, or both.35
33. For a comparative review of various meanings of "cost of capital" see Foster,
Capital Cost and Fair Return, 54 PuB. UTiL. FORT. 267-282 (1954).
34. "Brief of Niagara Frontier Transit System, Inc." in case No. 16384, Re:
Niagara Frontier Transit System, Inc., (N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm.) at 30 note 5 (1953).
The New York hearings are replete with expert testimony. In Ohio, where the
company president was the only one to testify on the cost of money, the commission felt
that the burden of proof was not sustained by the company and that the company
"should have introduced further evidence to support the cost of money . . .. " Re:
Mt. Vernon Telephone Corporation, (Ohio Pub. Ut. Comm.) 6 PUR 3d 1, 8 (Oct. 22,
1954). (There is a strongly worded dissent). A simple historical stock price averaged
over a period of ten years has been held to be an improper approach to the cost of equity
money in Massachusetts. New Eng. Teleph. & Teleg. Co. v. Department of Pliblic
Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 97 NE 2d 509 (1951) ; recently relied on in Re: Pittsfield Coal
Gas Company, (Mass. Dept. of Pub. Ut.) 3 PUR 3d 1, 5 (Feb. 18, 1954).
35. Case No. 16384. Re: Niagara Frontier Transit System, Inc., (N. Y. Pub.
Serv. Comm.) 31 (1954). (Mimeographed). In an earlier case, where a similar method
was used, the Commission did not put its criticism in this form but did say that "...
none of the annual rates . .. purports to be a measure of the present cost of money to
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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The Commission examiner is emphasizing that book value is
to be used as the ultimate basis of computation rather than the
market prices of equity securities. This reopens the question as
to the function of the "cost of money" evidence. If we are try-
ing to find what a prospective investor will require, can we assume
that he will make a comparison of earnings (or dividends) with
book value rather than the price he has to pay or is willing to pay
on the market? Will earnings or dividends as a percentage of
book value of equity securities tell us anything at all about the
cost of new money to the company?
In assessing the cost of money evidence it must constantly be
borne in mind that the Commission computes the ultimate rate of
return on the original cost base. In an earlier telephone case it
said:
Under all the facts and circumstances we find that a return
computed on an original cost rate base less depreciation re-
serves as of this time would be in the vicinity of 6 per cent.
We make no finding as to the proper rate of return upon any
other form of rate base.36
But if the Commission wishes to take account of the necessity
of attracting capital in determining the proper rate of return on
original most the earnings and dividends in relation to the market
prices of the equity securities are pertinent, rather than earnings
or dividends as a percentage of original cost. "Cost of money"
canot be based initially on original cost even if it is to be trans-
lated later into a rate of return on the original cost.
Once we take as our aim the attraction of future capital to
the utilities we are in the complicated realm of the inducement
to invest. What induces a person to invest in a particular line
of business? To what extent will a future investor be influenced
by how present investors are treated? There is no denying that
the tvo are closely related.87  The final test is what the investor
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
the company." Re: Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 96 PUR (NS) 194,
415, No. 12455, N. Y. Pub. Serv. Comm. (1952).
The relation between the return on old and new equity capital has been well stated
by the Massachusetts court: ". . . [C]ommonly a company cannot issue new stock
which will have a preferred position over stock already outstanding, and . . . the rate
must therefore be sufficient to pay the same dividends upon all the stock that are required
to enable the company to sell new stock." New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department
of Public Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 97 N. E. 2d 509, 513 (1951). But see Springer, A Fair
Return for a Natural Gas Utility, 54 Pum. UTmi. FORT. 500, 502 (1954).
36. Case No. 15235, supra, note 14 at 40 Cf. p. 42.
37. Rose, The Bell Telephone System Rate Cases, supra, note 6 at 715 n. 57, labels
as "sound economic principle" a statement that ". . . the only significant cost at the
present time is that economic cost which is established by the marginal productivity of
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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does when he is offered utility shares. It is a difficult test yet it is
apparently the one to which the Public Service Commission is
committed by its emphasis on flight of capital.
To say that evidence of inflation will be used in setting the
rate of return to be applied to the cost of the property does not
guarantee that the inflation in plant and equipment is actually
taken into account in any way. High percentage rates of return
on equities do not necessarily accompany high plant and equip-
ment prices. The utilities ask for consideration of the rise in
commodity and property prices; the Commission is willing to con-
sider the rise, if any, in rates of return on equities. The funda-
mental difference is this: The current rate of return on equity
capital is influenced by future inflationary prospects among other
things; the fact that prices of plant and equipment are now high
compared with some past period may not be reflected fully or at
all in the current rate of return on equities. Thus consideration
of current price levels compared with past price levels does not
necessarily show up in the rate of return nor does it give the
utilities the relief they are seeking.
In short, price increases that have occurred are not actually
reflected in the rate of return insofar as the latter is based on the
"cost of money". 88 If an original cost rate base is also used, infla-
tion- in plant and equipment prices appears nowhere in the com-
putation.
3. DEBT RATIO
In computing the cost of capital it is necessary to know how
much debt capital and how much equity capital is involved. The
Commission looks into the debt ratio and proposes to set rates
on the assumption that debt rather than equity capital be used
at least partly in financing new capital expenditures. The Com-
pany may, of course, issue shares if it wishes, but it should not
then expect the Commission to use the actual capital structure in
determining how much income should properly be provided: a
hypothetical debt ratio is used for that purpose. The Commission
is strongly impressed by the fact that the yield on debt capital is
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
the capital in alternative employment in the immediate future." Once we are in the
realm of inducement to invest, however, we must consider whatever the investor con-
siders. It has sometimes been said that "bygones are bygones in economics." In the
field of investment it is more accurate to say "bygones are gone but not forgotten."
Somers, A Theory of Income Determination, 58 J. PoL. EcoN. 523, 539 (1950).
38. See Bonbright, Utility Rate Control Reconsidered in the Light of Hope Natural
Gas Case, 38 Am. ECON. REv. 465 (1948). Cf. 2 BONDRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY,
1078-1165. See also Morton, Rate of Return and the Value of Money in Public Utilities,
28 LAND EcoN. 91 (1952) and Note, Original Cost Rate Regulation and Inflation, 66
HARv. L. Rxv. 1274, 1275 (1953).
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generally lower than that on equity capital and that corporate
dividends are derived from income that is subject to tax while
interest expense is tax-free.
Where debt capital costs in the neighborhood of only 31/2%,
as in the present case,39 this debt ratio is of the greatest importance
in setting telephone rates that will yield a rate of return on the
cost basis in the neighborhood of 6%, the Commission's target
rate.40  The cost of money derived through issuance of debt is
low relative to the cost of money derived through issuance of
equities: debt is "cheap money" and equities are "dear money"
we may say. For reasons of sound business practice the Com-
pany nevertheless chooses to keep the debt ratio low although
that raises the net cost of money as a whole. For example, if debt
costs 3% and equity capital costs 8% the sum of $1,000,000 can be
raised at a cost of 3% with a 100% debt ratio; 8% with a 0%
debt ratio; 613% with a 33,.% debt ratio; and 5.40% with a 45%
debt ratio. The current pay-outs to debt and equity holders would
be as follows to raise the $1,000,000:
Debt Ratio Pay-outs
100% $30,000
0% 80,000
331/3% 63,333
45% 54,000
The Company's target in the current case is a debt ratio of
331/3% while one of the Commission's witnesses used a ratio of
45% (the present ratio being 38%).41  The telephone rates would
have to be higher to finance a 331/3% ratio than a 45%, hence the
Commission's concern with debt ratio. As pointed out above, this
39. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 30.
40. Id. at 33.
41. Id. at 26-27, 30. In an earlier case the Commission refused to use a hypo-
thetical capitalization. New York Tel. Co., 84 PUR (NS) 267, 290 (1950).
The Pennsylvania commission has expressed the opinion that the capital structure
at any particular date was not of material significance: that the average over a reason-
able period of time was of far more significance. It took account of three capital struc-
tures: the company's actual capital structure; a structure consisting of equal portions
of debt and common stock; and a structure consisting of 45 per cent debt, 10 per cent
preferred stock, and 45 per cent common stock. It considered the following cost rates
reasonable: 3.25 per cent for long-term debt; 4.5 per cent for preferred stock; and 9.2
per cent for common stock; the overall current cost of capital being 6.05 per cent.
Pennsylvania Pub. Utility Conmission et al. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., Complaint Docket
Nos. 15980, 15981 (1954). 54 Pen. UTm. FoRT. 850-851 (1954).
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected the commission's use
of a 45-55 debt ratio and ruled that a ratio no higher than 40-60 should be used, the
actual ratio being 30-70. Re: Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co. No. 8194, December
22, 1954. 55 Pen. UTm. FORT. 287-288 (1955).
Massachusetts recently used the actual debt ratio of 34.2 per cent in the case of
an independent gas company. The regulatory body said: "While this is probably an
(Footnote continued on following page.)
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discrepancy is aggravated by the fact that interest paid is tax-
deductible while dividends are not.
This debt ratio may also affect the cost of money if investors
are influenced by the ratio in deciding how much to pay for a given
stock. Perhaps a low debt ratio gives a prospective buyer of stock
a greater feeling of confidence in stability of dividends with the
result that he is willing to pay a high enough price that a $9 divi-
dend represents merely a 5% cost of equity capital. Thus a low
debt ratio may actually lower the cost of money if it lowers the
cost of equity capital sufficiently. (It may also lower the cost of
money by lowering the cost of debt money: the less debt, the
safer creditors feel). It is not at all evident, therefore, that the
Commission's insistence on a high debt ratio actually favors low
telephone rates. Just how prospective investors are affected by
the debt ratio is to be determined. Since the Commission now
emphasizes "cost of money" it cannot properly ignore this factor
in determining the probable cost of money under various hypo-
thetical situations. The Commission recognizes this possibility
by saying, "If, as the company contends, this [constant decline
in the debt ratio] produces an added margin of safety, it should
also have a tendency to reduce the required rate of return.142
(Footnote continued from preceding page.)
uneconomic capitalization under present conditions, it appears that it has been many
years since respondent has been obliged to go into the market for equity financing, and
all of its new financing in recent years has been accomplished by the issuance of long-
term debt. Respondent is an independent operating unit, its stock being publicly held.
Under these circumstances, we -will adopt the actual debt ratio as proper for use in this
case!' Re: Pittsfield Coal Gas Company (Mass. Dept. of Pub. Ut.), 3 PUR 3d 1, 5
(1954).
Utah has adopted 40 per cent in face of an actual figure of 29.40 per cent. Re:
Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Utah Pub. Serv. Comm.), 2 PUR 3d 75, 81(1953).
New Jersey approved a debt ratio of 63.9 per cent in the case of a water coni-
pany (the maximum usually allowable being 60 per cent) under special circumstances.
Re: Commonwealth Water Company (N. J. Bd. of Pub. Ut. Comm.), 2 PUR 3d 58,
60 (1954).
Arkansas refuses to use a hypothetical debt ratio: "We should be indulging in
pure speculation if we were to select a hypothetical debt ratio and adjust the actual costs
of debt and equity capital to what we may think the investors would require in the
circumstances of an assumed change in the quality of the investment." It adopts the
existing 40 per cent debt ratio as reasonable. Re: Southwestern Bell. Teleph. Co.
(Ark. Publ. Serv. Comm.), 2 PUR 3d 1, 12 (1953).
Colorado adopts a hypothetical capital structure when the actual financial struc-
ture is not in the public interest because the debt ratio is too low. Re: Mountain States
Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Colo. Pub. Ut. Comm.), 1 PUR 3d 129, 140 (1953).
42. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 34.
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The same problem arose in New Mexico in another recent tele-
phone case (also part of the Bell system). The highest court of
the state said :43
Debt ratio is strictly a matter for management, but its evalua-
tion in fixing rates is an item for serious consideration by the
rate-making body.
Does not the use of a hypothetical debt ratio in rate-making neces-
sarily put pressure on management to change the debt ratio in a
direction which it considers undesirable? The company is treated
as if it had a less expensive debt ratio than it actually has. It is
penalized for its managerial decision. The problem, though, is
how much? Since we are committed to a psychological analysis
of the prospective investor we cannot ignore this element.
It should be noted parenthetically that the dividend exclusion
and credit in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Sections 34 and
116 benefit the shareholder directly, not the corporation. Only by
making equity securities more attractive and thus lowering the
dividend payments that the Company finds it necessary to make
can the new tax provisions reduce the burden on the corporation.
For instance, will an $8 dividend be just as attractive to share-
holders under the new law as the $9 dividend was under the old?
It is likely that there will be some effect, but the magnitude cannot
be determined in general.
The Commission is well aware of the fact that a high debt
ratio has its dangers. It speaks of the desirability of leaving a
margin of unused credit for future use. "Too high a debt ratio
43. State Corporation Commission v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph
Company, 58 NM 260, 270 P. 2d 685 (1954).
Cf. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, 327 Mass. 81,
97 N. E. 2d 509, 514 (1951).
. . . [W]e agree of course that a public regulatory body cannot assume the
management of the company and cannot under the guise of rate-making interfere
in matters of business detail with the judgment of its officers reached in good faith
and within the limits of a reasonable discretion. State of Missouri ex rel. South-
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission of Missouri, 262 U. S.
276, 288-289 (1923); Banton v. Belt Line Railway Corp., 268 U. S. 413, 421
(1925) ; New England Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public
Utilities, 262 Mass. 137, 146, .159 N. E. 743, (1928) ; Havre De Grace & Perry-
ville Bridge Co. v. Public Service Commission, 132 Md. 16, 22-24, 103 Atl. 319,
321 (1918). But we think that in this instance, in circumstances now existing
and especially in proceeding upon the "cost of capital" theory, the debt ratio is not
a matter of that kind.
More recently, the same court has said, in effect, that the Company could set up
any capital structure it wished and the commission could use a hypothetical structure.
The debt ratio had, in the meantime been reduced to 36.1 per cent from 62.1 per cent
and the commission (department) continued to use 45 per cent. New England Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, - Mass. - 121 N. E. 2d
896, 900-905 (1954). See also 54 PuB. UTm. FoRT. 777 (1954).
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as a long time policy may well be as expensive as too low a one."44
The more serious problem of reorganization or bankruptcy in case
of a serious decline in business should also be considered by the
Commission. The fixed obligation of debt may lead to drastic
legal consequences compared with the flexibility inherent in equity
capital. Although a telephone company is relatively invulnerable
to such contingencies, they cannot be ignored in rate-making in
general.
One may raise a question concerning the Commission's refusal
to accept the Company's existing or prospective debt ratio as the
basis for the computation of rate of return. The Commission
substitutes its own judgment as to capital structure for the man-
agement's judgment. Since debt ratio is unquestionably a matter
on which reasonable men may differ, and comes within the scope
of managerial discretion, there is doubt whether the Commission
should attempt to impose its own judgment in a question of this
sort.
4. ADrioNs TO SURPLUS (PAY-OUT RATIO)
Another factor related to the cost of money is the surplus to
be accumulated, i. e. the earnings that are to be permitted over and
above the dividends paid out. A Commission witness argued for
a 80% pay-out in the current case, a Company witness for a 65%o
pay-out. If it is settled how much has to be paid out, such as $9
per share, the 80% figure would require net earnings of about $11
per share while the 65% figure would require net earnings of ap-
proximately $14 per share. The crucial question is this: will the
prospective investor be influenced by the amount of reserve that
is being built up, i. e., by the surplus being accumulated, in short,
by the pay-out ratio? Would he not be willing to invest on the
basis of receiving, say $8 a share if he knows that a surplus of,
-say $6 is being reserved; even though he insists on $9 a share if,
say, only $3 is being reserved? In short, does not the pay-out
ratio affect the cost of money? This is a question of fact, and one
44. Case 16548, stpra, note 1 at 25. Cf. ". . . [W]e suppose it is a matter of com-
mon knowledge, that the proportion of debt capital cannot be extended indefinitely without
adversely affecting the credit of the company, injuring the market for its stock, and to
some degree that for its bonds also." New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Department of
Public Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 97 N. E. 2d 509, 512 (1951). Cf. Re: Connecticut Poler
Company (Connecticut Public Utilities Commission), 5 PUR 3d 65, 67 (1954).
The Pennsylvania commission stated in a recent case that the cost of common stock
capital generally tends to decrease in relation to significant increases in the proportion
of common equity in the capital structure. Pennsylvania Pub. Ut. Commission v. Jilwood
Consol. Water Co. et al., Complaint Dockets 15995 et al. July 12, 1954, 55 Pun. UTIL.
FoRT. 112 (1955).
There are some indications that equity financing may decline in the future partly
because of internal financing through accelerated depreciation. See 54 PUn. UTr,. FonT.
712 (1954).
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that is difficult to settle. One would certainly expect an investor
to be influenced by the surplus, which increases the book value of
the shares, but to what extent is he actually influenced? The Com-
mission says:
All witnesses agree that the principal consideration governing
the market price of the company's stock is the amount of divi-
dends paid (coupled, of course with a reasonable assurance that
payment will be continued) and that retained earnings do not
substantially contribute to the market price of the stock.45
The Commission undertook a detailed examination of the sur-
plus necessary to ensure reasonable stability in the $9 dividend.
For instance, it questioned the conservative investment policy of
the pension fund. This might appear remote from the question
of cost of capital but the Commission justified its approach by
stating that the Company's payments to the fund are increased
as a result of the conservative investment policy and the increased
payments cut into potential surplus. The Company asks, in effect,
that the cost of accumulating the surplus be passed on to the con-
sumers. The Commission says, "Under the law we can properly
disallow in fixing rates any wasteful or unnecessary expense of
operation. Clearly, since the cost of capital is such an expense,
it is our duty to determine what costs in obtaining money lie within
the realms of reason.' 46
45. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 29, Cf. "... [G]ood authority supports the
proposition that a public utility has a constitutional right to a sufficient return to enable
it to accumulate a reasonable surplus." New England Tel. & TeL Co. v. Department of
Public Utilities, 327 Mass. 81, 97 N. E. 2d 509, 517 (1951).
The Pennsylvania commission is in agreement with the New York commission
on this point. It has expressed the opinion that market yields (dividends-.price ratios)
were more significant than earnings-price ratios; that common stocks of utilities were
bought more on the basis of the dividend yield than in terms of the earnings cushion
behind the dividends, particularly in the case of a company with an extremely low pay-
out record. Pennsylvania Pub. Ut. Comm. v. Peoples Nat. Gas Co., supra, note 41.
The Massachusetts body has employed a 75 per cent pay-out ratio. Re: Pittsfield Coal
Gas Co. (Mass. Dept. of Pub. Ut.). 3 PUR 3d 1, 5 (1954).
The Utah commission is more nearly in agreement with Massachusetts: "Sound
business practice dictates that a continuing corporation should not pay out all of its earn-
ings in dividends. The retention of part of the earnings in the business provided protection
for future dividends and for unforeseen contingencies. Retained earnings also provide
capital to the company." Re: Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co., (Utah Pub. Serv.
Comm.) 2 PUR 3d 75, 84 (1953).
Arkansas allowed a 75-80 per cent dividend pay-out. Re: Southwestern Bell
Teleph. Co., (Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm.) 2 PUR 3d 1, 13 (1953).
Colorado feels that "the return should permit the payment of interest and reason-
able dividends, and should leave something to be passed to the surplus account." Re:
Mountain, States Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Colo. Pub. Ut. Comm.) 1 PUR 3d 129, 136
(1953). "It is our view that applicant requires equity earnings which would permit
the payment of a $6 dividend and the accumulation within, say, four years of surplus to
protect the dividend." Id. at 143.
The price-earnings ratio has been generally employed by utility commissions al-
though dividends have been considered in some instances. See Rose, The Bell Telephone
System Rate Cases, supra, note 6 at 716.
46. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 24.
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The above discussion is in terms of market price of the stock
but it can readily be translated into the amount of dividend that
has to be paid per share in any new financing. If the market price
goes up because of a large surplus, the cost of money is lower
because the company is receiving more dollars for each share for
which it pays the $9 dividend. If the market price goes down the
cost of money is higher because the company is receiving fewer
dollars for each share for which it pays the $9 dividend.
To what extent is the market price, hence cost of money, in-
fluenced by retained earnings? Although the experts are agreed
that the relation is minor, we need not rely solely on their opinion.
Statistical devices are available and have been used to measure
the probable effect.41  Such devices can be applied to a particular
stock and can be extended to take account of a large number of
factors.
It is interesting to contrast the Commission's "hands-off"
policy in the matter of wages with its willingness to intervene in
Company decisions on capital structure (debt ratio and reserves)
affecting the cost of money. The Commission says,
. . . when an obligation has been incurred under which the
employees of any company have vested rights, this Commission
has no authority in law to revise the bargain and to take from
labor that to which it is contractually entitled.
Here [with respect to reduced telephone rate to employees], as
in the discussion on pensions, interference with the judgment
of management would be injecting the Commission into what
amounts to the company's present contract of employment.
This Commission has repeatedly asserted its position that it
not interfere with the collective bargaining rights which have
become inherently part of our American system and that any
payment or benefit given labor, in the absence of proof of bad
faith, is presumptively a proper expenditure for fixing rates.
48
47. See Johnson, Shapiro and O'Meara, Valuation of Closely-Held Stock for
Federal Tax Purposes: Approach to an Objective Method, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 166
(1951).
48. Case 16548, supra, note 1 at 39. Cf. "In the absence of statutory authorization
it would hardly be contended that the commission has power to formulate the labor
policies of utilities, to fix wages or to arbitrate labor disputes." Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Public Utilities Commission of California, 34 Cal. 2d 822, 215 P. 2d 441 (1950). The
Massachusetts court has shown the same deference to the company's decision on certain
expense allowances for pensions, overruling the regulatory department. New England
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Department of Public Utilities, -, Mass. -, 121 N. E.
2d 896, 904-906 (1954). Similarly the Maine supreme court allowed the Company's
policy of a 10-year amortization of lump sum premium payments in face of the commis-
sion's order that a 30-year period be used. Re: Central Main Power Co. FC No. 1410,
December 14, 1954, 55 PuB. UTIL. FORT. 169 (1955).
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One may commend the Commission for the respect it accords
wage commitments and managerial judgment concerning them.
It is clear, however, that similar respect should not be accorded
managerial judgment in "cost of money" items such as capital
structure, debt ratio, pay-out ratio and the like?
5. REcAPrrULATION
We may now summarize the argument thus far. The pro-
cedure of setting utility rates in New York is as follows: (1) the
original cost of investment dedicated to the public use is deter-
mined from accounting records; this is known as the rate base;
(2) the rate of return that should be earned on that investment is
determined by tradition as well as an examination of the capital
market; (3) the rate of return is applied to the rate base, giving a
dollar amount of return; (4) the utility rates are then set at a
level that is expected to yield that dollar amount. The utilities
have been claiming that the original cost base (1) does not allow
for inflation in prices of plant and equipment. They therefore
ask for some consideration of reproduction cost. The Public
Service Commission prefers to keep to the relatively non-contro-
versial cost base and take account of inflation-if at all-in the
rate of return (2). It refuses to accept evidence on reproduction
cost. Moreover, the greater level of business activity that usually
accompanies inflation will show its effects in the market computa-
tions involved in setting the utility rates (4).
The main issue then centers about the determination of the
rate of return (2). There is undoubtedly a heavy reliance on a
sort of natural rate in the neighborhood of 6%. Expert testimony
is, however, admitted on this subject and probably has some influ-
ence on the outcome. The rate is that necessary to attract capital
or at least keep it from leaving. For this purpose it is necessary
to see what rate the company pays (or has to pay) on its bonds
and other debt, its preferred stock and its common stock. The
rate on debt is relatively easy to determine except where there
appears to be less than arms-length bargaining on the rate of in-
terest. As for equity shares, especially common stock, there is
reliance on the actual yield of outstanding securities together with
expert testimony on the yield necessary to attract new capital.
We may find, for instance, that debt capital requires 3% and equity
capital requires 8%. These are combined to produce an overall
rate of return (2). Two crucial questions arise: (a) Mhat pro-
portions shall be used in combining them? (b) How much income
should be permitted over and above what is paid out to suppliers
of capital? If we take the same amount of debt capital as equity
capital, for instance, the overall rate would be 51/2% in the above
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example. Should the actual proportions be used? This would
seem to be the proper procedure for (a) since we are dealing with
an actual capital structure. The Commission, however, feels free
to use its own hypothetical capital structure to combine the rates
if it believes that the company is not making sufficient use of the
less expensive debt capital. With respect to (b), should we take
the actual payout ratio or a hypothetical one? For instance, if
the company pays out $9 for every $12 it earns, making a pay-out
ratio of 75%, should the Commission allow utility rates to be set
high enough to continue adding $3 to surplus per share? When
all these questions are answered we are in a position to determine
the rates of return (2).
6. RATE BASE AND RATE OF RETURN UNDER A
"COST OF MoN1EY" APPROACH
There are some interesting consequences arising from the con-
tinued insistence by public utility commissions that there be estab-
lished first a rate base, then a rate of return, and finally a utility
rate structure, instead of going directly to a utility rate structure
that ensures a reasonable amount of earnings. The New York
commission says:
If a rate base be used which is a matter of speculative judgment
to which is applied a rate of return which is always a matter of
opinion, both are arguable variables. With the use of an invest -
ment rate base, the property account is rarely in dispute. The
answer as to the required number of dollars of income should be
the same irrespective of the formula used. We think the end
result can be more accurately reached by the method we have
used.49
Here there is a clear admission of the fact that the "required
number of dollars of income" is the figure to be determined and is
independent of the base used. Another way of saying this is that
with any given rate base, the rate of return will be adjusted so
as to yield the independently determined "required number of
dollars of income." Since the needed end result, the "required
number of dollars of income" has to be determined independently
anyway, why bother with going through the process subsequently
of rationalizing that number by setting a rate base and rate of
return?
The Commission is right in saying that the use of an invest-
ment base reduces the number of items to be argued about; or we
may say that it concentrates the argument into the rate of return.
Since the only grounds on which to argue about rate of return
49. Case 16548, sPra, note 1 at 20.
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stem from the desired level of utility income, the total amount of
argument is set by the latter and the only remaining question is
how to distribute the argument, whether to split it between the
base and the rate of return or whether to use a non-arguable base
and therefore concentrate the argument on the rate of return.
The futility of this process is clear. Since the "required number
of dollars of income" is considered necessary and the only thing
necessary to set the utility rates, the subsequent hind-sight deriva-
tion of those dollars by applying some rate of return to some rate
base is so much waste motion.
The question that arises is whether any rate base is needed
in a consistent application of the "flight of capital" rule of rate-
making. The aim is to set a rate which will result in earnings
which will prevent a flight of capital for the needs of the business.
The process of setting a rate base and then a rate of return is an
unnecessary carryover from the old "fair value" days. What-
ever the base, the rate of return will presumably be set so as to
result in sufficient earnings to meet the "ffight of capital" test.
Why then go through the unnecessary motions of setting a base
and a rate of return? Why not just decide on the level of earnings
which will pay interest on debt and give an adequate return to the
equity securities so as to make them sufficiently attractive in the
capital market? Much waste effort would be eliminated and all
parties would understand clearly what is involved. Motions for
introduction of evidence on reproduction cost would no longer have
to be denied-they would not have to be proposed in the first place.
The evidence to be submitted and considered would be concerned
with "cost of money", i. e. the yield on equity securities that would
be necessary to attract capital. From that, together with data
on the capital structure (actual or hypothetical---a point to be
settled) could be determined the total desirable earnings. This
could then be translated into a rate structure.
It should be pointed out that the device of going directly to
the amount of return instead of using a rate base and rate of return
is not to be confused with the procedure of setting utility rates
without any factual basis whatever. 'Under the Hope decision
(page .. above), the precise path taken by the administrative
agency is left open (barring a controlling statutory requirement)
as long as there is no abuse of the police power. Just as both
original cost and reproduction are consistent with the Hope deci-
sion so are other reasonable methods of arriving at the end result.
State courts have held, however, that some rate base is still neces-
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sary.50 These cases occurred in New Hampshire, Wisconsin and
Vermont. They will be considered in some detail since they bear
heavily on our problem.
In the New Hampshire case, the Public Service Commission
set utility rates after a balancing of a great many factors. It
made the statement:
. . . We know, however, that as a practical matter it is the
number of amount of dollars that a utility is permitted to earn
that is important. Rate bases and rates of return are without
significance except as related to each other.51
The court denies that the conunission is no longer bound to
disclose the "method employed." It refers to the fact that in
the Hope case and in subsequent decisions, "the findings of the
regulatory body whose orders were sustained disclosed a rational
process by which a rate base and a rate of return were determined
and applied, to produce the return translated into rates [citations
omitted] .. The emphasis is on a "rational process" and
on a disclosure of "method employed" to reach the prescribed
50. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Hampshire, 95 N. H. 353, 64 A. 2d;
Petition of New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 115 Vt 494, 66 A. 2d 135 (1949); Common-
wealth Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., 252 Wis. 481, 32 N. W. 2d 247 (1948). Rose,
The Bell Telephone Rate Cases, supra, note 6 at 702, n. 12 suggests that these cases
indicate that "some rate base appears still essential."
The following commission action in New Jersey has recently been reported: "The
New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners refused to establish permanent intra-
state railroad commutation rates in the absence of evidence as to the value of the rail-
road's property used in providing service, the related expenses, and a rate of return,
thereby confirming the necessity for a rate base, saying that if a rate base is not reason-
ably supported by the proofs, the rate itself is unreasonable." Re: New York, S. &
W. R. Co. Docket No. 8164, October 27, 1954, 55 Pun. Urn. FORT. 57 (1955).
The Colorado body on the other hand has insisted that in determining the fair
value of the property it was "not required to follow any particular set formula."
Re: Mountain States Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Colo. Pub. Ut. Comm.) 1 PUR 3d 129,
133 (1953). Nor is there any "one formula or set of formulas that the commission can
rely upon to arrive at a fair rate of return, nor can such rate of return be fixed solely
by any mathematical calculation." Id. at 144.
Cf. "It is the opinion of the Commission that a rate of return based upon the
'Cost of Money' not only ignores the right of the public to reasonable rates and gives
precedence to the right of the investor to a fair return, but also is too speculative and
conjectural to be accorded any weight in the determination of a fair and reasonable
'Rate of Return.'" Re: Southern Bell Teleph. & Teleg. Co. (Florida Railroad & Public
Utilities Commission), 92 PUR (N. S.) 335, 353 (1952).
The Circuit Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia has said: "It has even
been intimated that a commission may use some method of calculating rates other than
the traditional one which depends upon the finding of a rate base" [citing Colorado
Interstate Co. v. Federal Power Comm., 324 U. S. 581, 601 (1945)]. Public Utility
Comm. v. Washington Gas & Light Co., 188 F. 2d 11, 18 (D. C. Cir. 1950). See
Note, Hope Case and Recent Federal Decisions, 54 W. VA. L. REV. 305 (1952).
51. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Hampshire, supra, note 50, 64 A. 2d
at 12. See Note, State Public Service Commission, Required to Adopt Rate Base
Method in Determining Telephone Rates, 62 HARv. L. Ray. 1247 (1949).
52. New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Hampshire, sipra, note 50, 64 A. 2d
at 14.
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rates, so that "the validity of its conclusions may be tested upon
judicial review.'' 5 There is no requirement in this case that the
old formula of rate base and rate of return be used. The "cost
of money" approach can surely be claimed as a rational process
capable of judicial review. It is only after reference to a New
Hampshire statute which speaks of ". . a reasonable return on
the cost of the property . . ." (R. L. c. 292 § 28) that the court
decides, "In this case, a definite finding by the commission of the
base upon which the company is entitled to a return is required
by New Hampshire law."5  Again, when the court speaks more
generally it merely says, "In our opinion, the relief furnished by
the Hope case from the Constitutional restrictions of a formula,
do not operate to relieve the Commission of the duty to make find-
ings of fact essential to permit review of its conclusions. ' 55
There is no reference here to rate base or rate of return. There is
even a suggestion that another method might be acceptable in the
statement: "The record appears to afford no basis for determina-
tion of a proper return by any process other than the usual rate
base method.""
In the Wisconsin case the commission's findings of fact were
simply the following:
1. That the existing rates applicable to the service furnished
by Commonwealth Telephone Company by and through the
facilities of its Two Rivers exchange afford an excessive
profit to said utility and are therefore unreasonable.
2. That the rates herein prescribed for such services are just
and reasonable. 57
It need hardly be pointed out that a holding that these findings
of fact are inadequate does not mean that the court is holding that
the traditional method of rate base and rate of return is necessary.
The court does make a reference to rate base in its statement:
How can the Commission or the reviewing court or the utility
or the public determine whether the profit is proper unless the
Commission makes specific findings of the 'relevant facts and
circumstances'? The Commission must determine what those
are and set them forth as required by law. Those essential facts
which control each case will then determine the rate base. 58
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Id., at 15.
56. Id., at 16.
57. Commonwealth Tel. Co. v. Public Service Comm., supra, n. 50, 32 N. W. 2d at
247 (1948).
58. Id., at 248.
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The reference to "rate base" here appears to be incidental, the
main plaint being that there were no specific findings of the
"relevant facts and circumstances." The final holding is: "The
present method of the Commission is improper and must be aban-
doned".-9 There is no holding that there must be a rate base and
rate of return.
In the Vermont case the court refers to the necessity of a rate
base. Much of its concern is, however, with the commission's fail-
ure to make adequate findings on matters of expense. This is not a
problem of rate base but one which arises under the "cost of mon-
ey" approach as well since the expense item is the connecting link
between the amount of return (however arrived at) and the utility
rates themselves. (Amount of net profit plus expenses equals
gross receipts). The Hope case is cited simply to the effect that
it "did not change this rule ["a proper rate base and allowable
expenses"] for. . . this case did not reject judicial right of review
as to reasonableness of rates and obviously if it be held that no
yardstick is necessary whereby to test this question then judicial
review as to reasonableness of rates would become utterly mean-
ingless. ''1 It cannot be assumed that the Vermont court would
have insisted on a determination of rate base if the other parts
of the commission's findings of fact were adequate to an evalua-
tion of the reasonableness of the rates.
It is submitted that the United States Supreme Court might
find that a total absence of rate base is consistent with its decision
in the Hope case and safeguards both procedural and substantive
due process, provided that an adequate factual basis exists other-
wise for the utility rates that are established. The Court said
in that case (reiterating in part a statement made in an earlier
casel) :
the Commission was not bound to the use of any single
formula or combination of formulae in determining rates .
59. Id. at 249.
60. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., - Vt. -, 66 A. 2d 135, 139 (1949).
In New England Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Kennelly, - R. I. -, 98 A. 2d 835, 837, 839
(1953), the court remanded to the public utility administrator for clarification and amplifi-
cation there the administrator had not shown "on what basis or rate" he had selected
the amount which he considered the company entitled to receive as net income. The
administrator had rejected the attraction of capital as a factor and had said that he
considered that "the paramount issue in this proceeding is to provide respondent with
sufficient net telephone earnings for the adequate maintenance and operation of its exist-
ing plant". The court stated that ". . . the basis upon which the decision and order of
an administrator rests should be disclosed . . .". The court did not, however, spe-
cifically require the rate base-rate of return method.
61. Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U. S. 575, 586(1942).
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And when the Commission's order is challenged in the courts,
the question is whether that order "viewed in its entirety"
meets the requirements of the [lfatural Gas] Act . . . Under
the statutory standard of "just and reasonable" it is the result
reached not the method employed which is controlling
[citations omitted] . . . It is not the theory but the impact
of the rate order which counts. If the total effect of the rate
order cannot be said to be unjust and unreasonable, judicial in-
quiry under the Act is at an end. [Emphasis supplied through-
out.]6 2
Florida apparently accepts this interpretation fully:
The Florida commission has never been greatly concerned over
the rate of return. It has been much more interested in the
dollar requirements of the utility. How many dollars does the
utility require in order to meet its operating expenses, deprecia-
tion charges, taxes, maintenance expense, debt service, dividend
requirements, and transfer a reasonable amount to surplus?
When the commission has been able to determine the answer to
this question then the rate of return becomes a simple matter of
computation.63
The waste motion involved in the traditional procedure is
demonstrated almost painfully in a recent Nebraska decision
which first sets the earnings and then computes various possible
rates of return on various possible rate bases. It finds that:
1. Annual net telephone earnings in the amount of $2,127,022
is a fair and reasonable return to the applicant and would
enable the company to pay its debt charges and a reasonable
dividend on its stock and provide a reasonable amount for
surplus and that such a return upon investment would at-
tract the capital required for plant additions and improve-
ments.
2. An annual return of $2,127,022 is equivalent to a rate of
return of 5.97 per cent on a rate base of $35,635,849, or
4.44 per cent on a rate base of $4:7,868,640, or 6.05 per
cent on a rate base of $35,157,936, or 6.27 per cent on a
rate base of $33,916,742, and that the respective rate of
return on any of these bases is fair and reasonable. 64
A caveat must be issued on any prediction as to what the
Supreme Court might do if it ever heard the telephone cases. The
Hope case was concerned with a federal regulatory body and with
a federal statute which prescribed "just and reasonable" rates.
62. Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U. S. 591, 602 (1944).
63. Petteway, Utility Regulatory Climate in Florida, 54 PuB. Urr. FOR. 563,
569 (1954).
64. Re: Northwestern Bell Telephone Company (Nebraska State Railway Corn-
mission) 5 PUR 3d 24 30 (1954).
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The likelihood is strong that in such a situation the rigamarole
of rate base and rate of return might be dispensed with, in view
of the quotations given above. What the Supreme Court would
do in reviewing a State court's review of a State administrative
agency's application of a State statute requiring consideration of
"'value" is another matter. At any rate, if our interpretation of
the Hope decision is valid, that decision cannot be considered an
absolute bar to the simpler approach to rate-maing suggested
here: to determine the number of dollars of income required to
ensure adequate capital and set utility rates that will yield that
income. Rate base and rate of return would be ignored in the
absence of a statutory requirement that they be considered.
In short, in a jurisdiction committed entirely to the "cost of
money" approach, it matters little whether original cost or repro-
duetion cost is used as the rate base. The rate of return will be
adjusted accordingly so as to yield the same total number of dol-
lars, i. e. the number of dollars required to prevent a flight of cap-
ital. As long as the rate base and the rate of return are kept
inversely related to each other so that their product results in the
same dollar figure, any requirement that the commission consider
reproduction cost in setting the rate base will be abortive. If the
telephone company succeeds in imposing this requirement in the
current case, it will still have before it the task of convincing the
commission or the court that a lower rate of return on a higher
rate base conflicts with the statutory or constitutional standard
even though the resulting number of dollars is the same as before
and is sufficient to prevent a flight of capital. That will bring us
back once more to the wording of the New York statutes and the
constitutional aspects of the Hope decision. The question will then
be: Can the commission set rates just sufficient to meet the "cost
of money" even though the statute says it must give due regard,
among other things "to a reasonable average return upon the value
of the property . . . "9 In other words, does the "cost of money"
approach meet the statutory standard for telephone companies in
New York7
